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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
is arguably the soundest copyright court in the nation. In 
Tasini v. New York Times,1 it handled a challenge brought by 
a group of freelance writers against publishers and database 
proprietors. The controversy, now pending in the United States 
Supreme Court, has wide importance because it will determine 
what entitlements attach to a publisher who purchases a privi-
lege to include a freelancer's story in the publisher's magazine 
or newspaper. Essentially, the issue is whether a publisher, 
who has not purchased the story's copyright and has not ob-
tained an explicit agreement regarding electronic rights, may 
nevertheless exploit the story electronically. 
All parties in Tasini concede that the copyrights lay with 
the freelancers.2 Nevertheless, the defendants put the 
freelancers' contributions online and into CD-ROMs and made 
them available for individual download by consumers-all 
without consulting or compensating the copyright owners.3 
• ©2000 Wendy J. Gordon. All Rights Reserved. 
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Tasini v. New York Times Co., 192 F.3d 356 (1999), cert. granted sub nom. New 
York Times Co. v. Tasini, 121 S. Ct. 425 (Mem) (2000) [hereinafter Tasini Il]. 
2 Id. at 165. 
3 Id. at 164-65. 
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The publishers defended their actions by claiming a privilege 
under a provision of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Copyright 
Act") that authorizes a presumptive privilege to republish 
"under certain limited circumstances."4 The Second Circuit, 
however, rebuffed the defendants' view. Indeed, the court 
agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that if print publishers want 
electronic rights from the freelancers with whom they deal, 
they must obtain those rights by specific agreements.5 
In the course of a generally sound decision, however, the 
court glossed over some matters of statutory application, and it 
may have been a bit overly generous to the plaintiffs. It is 
worth setting these details right lest they obscure the straight-
forward slam-dunk at the core of the plaintiffs' case. Thus, this 
Essay's key point is statutory: Regardless of whether the mak-
ing of a digital collection infringes a freelancer's right of 
reproduction, the publisher and his database licensee clearly 
infringe the right of distribution when they make the article 
available for individual downloads. In addition, this Essay ad-
dresses some of the ethical and economic aspects of the contro-
versy over electronic rights. 
Specifically, Part I summarizes Tasini and analyzes key 
sections of the Second Circuit and district court opinions. Part 
II examines three aspects of the statutory provision under 
which the publishers seek shelter: (1) the limited privilege to 
"reproduce"6 the freelance contribution; (2) the separate and 
equally limited privilege to "distribute" the contribution7; and 
(3) the statutory requirement that both privileges only apply to 
a freelance contribution that is reproduced or distributed "as 
' H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 122 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
available at 1976 WL 14045. The provision at issue is the second sentence of 17 
U.S.C. § 201(c): 
(c) Contributions to Collective Works.-Copyright in each separate contri-
bution to a collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective 
work as a whole, and ve3ts initially in the author of the contribution. In 
the absence of an exprees transfer of the copyright or of any rights un-
der it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have 
acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribu-
tion as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collec-
tive work, and any later collective work in the same series. 
17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000) (emphasis added). 
5 Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 171. 
6 Id. 
1 Id. 
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part of' a larger whole.8 Part III briefly discusses the 
alienability of the privileges.9 Finally, Part IV examines some 
of the ethical and economic implications of the Tasini decision. 
Regarding the freelancers' rights of reproduction10 and 
the corresponding publishers' privilege, this Essay suggests 
that the Second Circuit correctly held that the NEXIS data-
base, and a similarly constructed CD-ROM, embodied infring-
ing reproductions.11 These computer versions did not attempt 
to replicate or revise entire print issues; accordingly, they 
could not constitute, under the applicable statutory presump-
tive privilege, a later edition or "revision of that collective 
work."12 Therefore, they exceeded the privilege. Nevertheless, 
this Essay concedes that the court may have been overbroad in 
holding that all the computer texts were infringing reproduc-
tions.13 Conceivably, there was no violation of the reproduc-
tion right in those few instances where a defendant's website 
or CD-ROM reproduced the exact format and full content of 
their magazine or newspaper as a unified whole. 
Even if a particular digital product can be considered a 
privileged "revision" and therefore lawfully made-and this Es-
say expresses no opinion about whether exact full-format digi-
tal reproductions fall within the statutory privilege-infringe-
ment can still occur because freelancers have not only a repro-
duction right, but also an exclusive right of distribution.14 
This Essay points out that regardless of whether including an 
article in an online database or CD-ROM infringes the copy-
right owner'E right of reproduction, a publisher exceeds his 
privilege of distribution when he allows individual articles to 
be downloaded because making an individual article available 
for download is not distributing it as "part of' the whole. Thus, 
such an act exceeds the applicable privilege. Furthermore, it is 
not redeemed by the possibility that a person at home who is 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000) (granting the exclusive right of reproduction to 
copyright owners). 
11 Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 168-69. 
12 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000). 
13 Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 170. 
" 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (granting the exclusive right of distribution to copyright 
owners). 
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receiving the download may be shielded by the fair use doc-
trine.15 Regardless of whether a home user is making an in-
fringing reproduction, the act of distribution is separately cog-
nizable. 
I. THE TASINI DECISION: BACKGROUND 
Jonathan Tasini is the president of the National Writers' 
Union. He and several other freelance writers brought suit 
against their publishers and several proprietors of electronic 
databases, most notably Mead Data, the owner of LEXIS-
NEXIS. The complaint alleged that the publishers infringed 
the freelancers' copyright when they published the freelancers' 
articles electronically or licensed the database proprietors to 
distribute their articles, in both instances without obtaining 
the freelancers' permission or paying them anything beyond 
what was initially paid to publish the article.16 
The legal background is straightforward. The Constitution 
empowers Congress to give authors exclusive rights in their 
writings for limited times. 17 Therefore, Congress promulgated 
the Copyright Act, 18 which secures federal copyrights to every-
one who writes, records music, takes photographs, or otherwise 
15 The fair use doctrine privileges behavior that might otherwise be infringing. 
It imds statutory recognition in 17 U.S.C. § 107. That Section provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of 
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purpos-
es such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multi-
ple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringe-
ment of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in 
any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall in-
clude-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair 
use if such f""mding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
17 u.s.c. § 107. 
16 Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 163. 
17 U.S. CONST., art. I § 8 cl. 8. 
18 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. 
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fixes a work of creative authorship "in any tangible medium of 
expression."19 Initial copyright ownership inheres in the cre-
ative persons themselves,20 unless they produce the items as 
"works for hire."21 Moreover, copyrights are not lost when an 
author or artist sells an individual copy-even if that copy is 
the original and only fixation of the work.22 A copyright owner 
can assign her copyright only if such assignment is in writing 
and signed by the copyright owner or her agent. 23 
Thus, under the Copyright Act, a company that publishes 
a magazine or newspaper owns the copyrights only of three 
classes of writers: company employees, 24 non-employees who 
assign a copyright interest to the publisher and execute a writ-
ing memorializing the assignment,25 and non-employees who 
have composed something for the publisher "on commission" 
and who sign a work for hire agreement. 26 Without a written 
agreement or an employer-employee relationship, the publisher 
can obtain only a non-exclusive license to publish. 
In everyday terms, a non-exclusive license to publish a 
work is "permission" to publish.27 A layperson might even call 
19 Id. § 102. 
20 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000). 
21 
"In the case of a work made for hire, the employer . . . is considered the 
author." Id. § 201(b); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "work made for hire"). 
22 17 u.s.c. § 202 (2000). 
23 Id. § 204(a). 
2
' Id. § 201(b). "A work made for hire is (1) a work prepared by an employee 
within the scope of his or her employment .... " 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "work 
made for hire"). 
25 A contractual transfer of copyright is valid only if it "is in writing and 
signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized 
agent." 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). A non-exclusive license is not a "transfer of copyright 
ownership," see 17 U.S.C. § 101, and therefore, it does not have to be in writing. 
See Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 1992). 
26 
"[A] work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a 
collective work" can be a work for hire "if the parties expressly agree in a written 
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for 
hire." 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (defining "work made for hire"). 
27 This common-sense point was obscured in Tasini by the court's comment 
that "each Author owns the copyright in an individual work and . . . has neither 
licensed nor otherwise transferred any rights under it to a Publisher or electronic 
database. These works were published with the Authors' consent, however, in par-
ticular editions of the periodicals owned by the Publishers." Tasini II, 206 F.3d 
161, 165 (2nd Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). The sentences could not mean what 
they literally say because if there is "consent," there is, by definition, a "li-
cense"-ordinarily a non-exclusive one. Probably, in penning this sentence, the 
court had in mind only "exclusive licenses." 
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it a "right" to publish. For example, a guest in a private home 
might say to a stranger contesting her presence, "I have a 
right to be here," which means, "I have permission to be here." 
However, in the Hohfeldian terms that lawyers use when they 
wish to be precise, a non-exclusive license is a "privilege,"28 
generated by the copyright owner's partial waiver of her right 
to exclude. Unlike a transfer of copyright, non-exclusive licens-
es are not required to be in writing. Instead, they can flow 
from conversations and overall dealings between the parties or 
by operation of law.29 
Ordinarily, non-exclusive licenses, or "privileges," can be 
subdivided as finely as rights and their assignment.30 There-
28 See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE 
L.J. 16 (1913); see also WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CON-
CEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING, AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS cw. Cook 
ed. 1923). 
A Hohfeldian "right" involves the ability to call upon the government to act. 
HOHFELD, supra, at 37. In the Hohfeldian scheme, for every "right" there is a 
corresponding "duty." HOHFELD, supra, at 38. It is this right/duty pairing that the 
right-holder can call upon the government to enforce. Someone who has non-exclu-
sive permission to use a resource owned by another is freed from his or her ordi-
nary duty to refrain from using the item. However, the person with such a non-
exclusive license has no "rights" to exclude third parties from the resource because 
(by definition) his license is non-exclusive. Therefore, all he has is a liberty of use. 
Such liberty is termed a "privilege" by Hohfeld-a freedom from governmentally 
imposed duties. HOHFELD, supra, at 42. 
Hohfeld calls right and duty "correlatives" of each other because if one person 
has a right, some other person must, logically, possess a duty. HOHFELD, supra, at 
38. He calls duties and privileges "opposites" because the same person cannot 
simultaneously possess both a duty and a privilege regarding the same resource or 
action. HOHFELD, supra, at 39. (I am grateful to Matt Neal for that formulation.) 
The opposite of a right is the apt but awkwardly named "no-right"-that is, a "no-
right" is the lack of power to use the state to compel behavior. In sum, the pos-
sessor of a non-exclusive license has a "privilege" to do what the license permits. 
The owner has "no right" to stop him (at least, he has no right to do so until the 
privilege is revoked) but the non-exclusive licensee has "no rights" to use the pow-
er of the state against third parties. By contrast, the possessor of an exclusive li-
cense has the ability to exclude third parties according to the terms of the license. 
Such a person has Hohfeldian rights as well as privileges. Logically, as well as 
statutorily, only the possessor of an exclusive right is in line to qualify as an 
owner of property. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "transfer of copyright ownership"); 
see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2). 
29 Pinkham, 983 F.id at 831 ("[U)nlike an exclusive license, an authorization 
can be given orally or implied from conduct."). 
30 The principles that counsel against alienability, tend to apply with different 
force when rights are waiued rather than transferred. In a waiver (i.e. the grant of 
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fore, a separate non-exclusive license can apply to each aspect 
of the copyright owner's many exclusive rights.31 Each such 
grant of permission can be quite valuable. In particular, some-
one who has the appropriate permission to use another 
person's work can join that work to other works in such a way 
that she creates a copyrightable work of her own-a "compila-
tion." In the case of compilations, the new copyright does not 
attach to the individual items, of which the compilation is 
comprised, but rather it attaches to the selection and ordering 
of the items.32 A compilation of individually copyrightable ar-
ticles (such as a magazine, newspaper, or encyclopedia) is 
called a "collective work," and a "collective work" copyright can 
co-exist with the individual authors' copyrights.33 Indeed, ac-
cording to the statute, "Copyright in each separate contribution 
to a collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective 
work as a whole .... "34 
Typically, an individual magazine will be subject to many 
copyrights. For example, assume that the publisher who owns 
the copyright in a "collective work" (e.g., a magazine) has ob-
tained permission, but no assignments of copyright, from oth-
ers. Then, side-by-side with the publisher's collective-work 
copyright, photographers will own the copyrights in their re-
spective photographs, advertising agencies will own the copy-
rights in their respective advertisements, the publisher will 
own the copyright in any article written by his employees in 
the scope of their employment, and freelancer writers will own 
the copyrights in the works they have contributed. Conse-
quently, a third party who copied the entire magazine would 
violate all of these copyrights, and he would be liable both to 
a privilege) the right-holder does not alienate himself from the right but instead 
merely allows another to share in its exercise. See Wendy J. Gordon & Sam 
Postbrief, On Commodifying Intangibles, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 135, 152-54 
(1998). 
31 See 17 U.S.C § 106 (codifying exclusive rights of copyright holders that can 
be subdivided and separately conveyed); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 123 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, auailable at 1976 WL 14045 (endors-
ing "the principle of divisibility of copyright"). 
32 A compilation can exist either in an assembly of items that are not them-
selves copyrightable (e.g. a set of statistics) or of an assembly of elements that 
may be individually copyrightable. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "compilation"). The 
latter scenario is the fact pattern in Tasini. 
33 17 U.S.C. § 201(c). 
"' Id. 
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the publisher as owner of the copyright in the "collective work" 
and to the owners of the copyrights in the individual articles, 
photogr~phs, and ads. Thus, to lawfully reproduce the entire 
magazine, the third party would need the permission of all the 
copyright owners. Furthermore, although the owner of copy-
right in the collective work himself may have a privilege to 
reproduce a photograph or article for a particular purpose, he 
does not necessarily have any legal power to convey general 
privileges of reproduction to others. 
Ordinarily, someone who bargains for one privilege (such 
as the privilege to print a freelance article in a magazine or 
newspaper) only receives what he has bargained for. However, 
sometimes bargains are unclear or expensive to specify fully, 
and for these and other reasons, the law may create presump-
tions as to their scope. Under § 201(c),35 such a presumption 
affects the dealings between publishers and freelancers. In rel-
evant part, § 201(c) provides: 
Contributions to Collective Works .... In the absence of an express 
transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of copy-
right in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only the 
privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of 
that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, 
and any later collective work in the same series.36 
It is upon this presumptive privilege that the publishers and 
database providers in Tasini rested their defense. The defen-
dants argued that the database collections of articles were 
"revisions" of the newspapers or magazines for which the 
plaintiff freelancers voluntarily had contributed material.37 
Furthermore, they argued that there was nothing in the deal-
ings of the parties to contradict this presumption.38 Therefore, 
since§ 201(c) presumptively authorizes publishers to reproduce 
and distribute "revisions," the defendants claimed that they 
35 The Second Circuit withdrew its first Tasini opinion to substitute a slightly-
amended version, which changed most of the references to "privilege" to "presump-
tive privilege." Apparently, this was to emphasize that the privilege was not a 
mandatory privilege and that it could be eliminated by the parties' agreement. 
Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 106. 
36 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (emphasis added). 
37 Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 809 (S.D.N.Y.), reu'd, 206 
F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. New York Times Co. v, Tasini, 
121 S. Ct. 425 (2000) [hereinafter Tasini I]. 
38 Id. at 810-12. 
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were authorized to put the freelancers' articles online and into 
CD-ROM form, and that they could convey this purported au-
thorization to database publishers.39 
Of course, the plaintiffs disagreed. They challenged the 
notion that § 20l(c) could be interpreted so broadly. Further-
more, they argued that whatever privilege is granted by § 201 
could not be transferred.40 Unfortunately, the statute nowhere 
defines a privileged "revision" under § 201(c), and it takes no 
explicit stand on the issue of transferability.41 Thus, it will be 
useful to examine§ 201(c) in some depth. 
II. THE PRESUl\IIPTIVE PRIVILEGE AND ITS SCOPE 
Section 20l(c) is part of a complex set of statutory provi-
sions, but its legislative history provides some assistance. To 
clarify the language, "only the privilege of reproducing and dis-
tributing the contribution as part of that particular collective 
work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collec-
tive work in the same series," the House Report provided ex-
amples: 
Under the language of this clause a publishing company could re-
print a contribution from one issue in a later issue of its magazine, 
and could reprint an article from a 1980 edition of an encyclopedia 
in a 1990 revision of it; the publisher could not revise the contribu-
tion itself or include it in a new anthology or an entirely different 
magazine or other collective work.42 
Digital databases hardly seem to fall within these com-
mon-sense guidelines. Moreover, a website that enables down-
loading of individual articles is distributing those individual 
articles.43 Such a use falls outside of the narrow privilege that 
"' Id. at 806. 
40 Id. at 815. 
41 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 201. 
42 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 122-23 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. 
5659, available at 1976 WL 14045. 
"" The average web-surfer thinks of downloading as an act that he or she per-
forms as the sole active party. For example, when an attorney uses NEXIS, 
LEXIS, or WESTLA W to retrieve an article, she probably imagines that her com-
puter sends a message that opens a drawer of the database, whereupon the at-
torney's computer makes a snapshot copy of the desired contents and brings the 
copy home. That mental picture errs in several ways, most importantly by depict-
ing the database and its server as passive. To the contrary, the servers actually 
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allows the publisher only to reprint and distribute the individ-
ual article "as part of' a larger whole. This Essay argues that 
the enabling of downloads resolves any doubts about the per-
missibility of the defendants' conduct with regard to NEXIS.44 
Before reaching that question, however, the definition of a key 
word in§ 201(c), "revision," should be addressed. 
A. The Nature of a "Revision": Comparing the View of the 
Second Circuit and the District Court 
The district court had deliberately interpreted the term 
"revision" quite broadly, 45 and it employed a two-step logic 
that implicitly placed the definitional burden on the plaintiffs. 
First, the court asked whether the database was "substantially 
similar" to the printed issue of the periodical and "recogniz-
able" as a version of those periodicals.46 This inquiry deliber-
ately paralleled the inquiry into what constitutes an infringing 
use; the classic test for determining if a work infringes 
another's copyright is whether the two works are "substantial-
ly similar.''47 Using that test, the district court indeed con-
cluded that enough of the original work's selection had been 
preserved so that the database would have infringed the print 
periodicals if done without the publishers' permission.48 The 
district court then came to its second step: asking whether "the 
resulting work might be so different in character from that 
load the article from their databases and send it to the customer's personal com-
puter. See, e.g., Chris Hughes & Gunther Birznieks, Serving Up Webserver Basics, 
at http://webcompare.internet.com/webbasics/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2001). 
Admittedly, there is no perfect match between the Copyright Act's notion of '"dis-
tribution" and what happens when a database server enables a download. See 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars On The "Information Superhighway": Authors, 
Exploiters, and Copyright In Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1482 (1995). 
Nevertheless, the cases holding that the server's behavior constitutes "distribution" 
seem justifiable. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
•• See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c). The two CD-ROM products involve different technolo-
gy than the online database. A CD-ROM copy of a collective work may not neces-
sarily "distribute" individual articles. 
45 Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 819-20, 824. 
•• Id. at 821-25. 
47 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT ch.13, § 13.03 
(2000). 
48 
"[I]f NEXIS was produced without the permission of The New York Times or 
Newsday or Time, these publishers would have valid claims of copyright infringe-
ment against MEAD." Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 826. 
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collective work which preceded it that it cannot fairly be 
deemed a revision.m9 Concluding that such a "difference" had 
not been shown, the district court found the database privi-
leged.50 
Thus, the district court, in its discussion of substantial 
similarity, came dangerously close to defining a privileged 
"revision" as if the category embraced anything that used a 
substantial part of the print periodical.51 An example can help 
clarify why such a view would be inappropriate. Assume, for 
example, that someone had made an exciting collection of short 
poems. If the collector had the poets' permission to make the 
anthology, his "selection or arrangement" of the poems could 
give him a collective work copyright, and he would have all the 
presumptive privileges that are granted under § 201(c). As-
sume also that later a composer used all but one of the poems, 
in the same sequence, as lyrics for an opera. That opera would 
be a "derivative work" of both the anthology and the copied 
poems, infringing if it was done without permission. It would 
infringe both the collector's ordering and selection of the poems 
and the individual poets' language.52 Although the composer 
might settle his lawsuit with the anthologist, he still would be 
liable to the individual poets. No one would imagine that § 
201(c) would authorize anthologists to create musical versions. 
Thus, of the immense number of potentially infringing works 
that can be made from a collective work, only a small subset 
would constitute "revisions." 
The Second Circuit recognized that the issues arising un-
der § 20l(c) were quite different from those arising in cases 
addressing whether a collective work is infringing because it is 
"substantially similar" to another. Therefore, the Second Cir-
49 Id. at 825. 
so Id. at 826. 
51 This Essay suggests that the district court was influenced by the incorrect 
view that it would be "anomalous" for something "substantially similar" not to 
constitute a "revision" under § 201(c). See Tasini v. New York Times Co., 981 F. 
Supp. 841, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying motion for reconsideration). Nevertheless, 
it should be noted that the district court pulled back from treating "substantial 
similarity" as the sole test for determining whether a database constituted a privi-
leged "revision." Id. 
62 Thus, the owner of the collective-work copyright could successfully sue the 
composer, as could the owners of copyright in the individual poems. 
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cuit properly put aside the "substantial similarity" analysis53 
and the notion that the plaintiffs had to prove any special 
"difference."54 Instead, it focused on how the daily and 
monthly periodicals had been virtually dissolved in the NEXIS 
database and on how the databases were primarily used-to 
provide end users access to "the preexisting materials that 
belong to the individual author."55 Accordingly, the Second 
Circuit found the database not to constitute a permissible 
"revision."56 
Furthermore, the Second Circuit was concerned that the 
publishers' reading of the statute "would cause the exception to 
swallow the rule."57 The court wrote, "[W]ere the permissible 
uses under § 201(c) as broad and as transferable as appellees 
contend, it is not clear that the rights retained by the Authors 
could be considered 'exclusive' in any meaningful sense."58 
Moreover, the Second Circuit noted that interpreting "revision" 
too broadly would make part of§ 20l(c) superfluous.59 Recall 
that the provision gives a presumptive privilege to "a later 
collective work in the same series" as well as to "revisions" of 
the particular collective work.60 If a "revision" is defined so 
broadly as to embrace any electronic database that takes some 
of what the print publisher selected for inclusion, "revision" is 
so broad as to leave no need for the specific mention of "collec-
tive work in the same series. "6l Yet the statute also contains 
the latter phrase. Since a statute should be construed in a way 
that gives meaning to each of its parts, construing a statute in 
a way that makes part of it redundant should be avoided. 
In rejecting the broad interpretation of "revision," the Sec-
ond Circuit is persuasive. Given what Congress intended when 
enacting the provision, 62 it seems absurd to contend that pub-
53 Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 168-69, 169 n.4. 
"' Id. at 169 n.4. 
55 Id. at 169. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 168. 
58 Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 168. 
59 Id. 
60 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000). 
61 Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 167. 
62 In the eyes of at least one court, "[C)ongress passed the section to enlarge 
the rights of authors." Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 
1998). 
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lishers who pay for print rights should also presumptively have 
free rein to sell mass licenses to electronic media. Most impor-
tantly, in what I view as the crux of the opinion, the court 
noted: 
[S]ection 201(c) would not permit a Publisher to sell a hard copy of 
an Author's article directly to the public even if the Publisher also 
offered for individual sale all of the other articles from the particular 
edition. We see nothing in the revision provision that would allow 
the Publishers to achieve the same goal indirectly through 
NEXIS.63 
The opinion, however, did not anchor this consideration as 
firmly in the statutory language as it might have. This is be-
cause the court never focused on § 201(c)'s "as part of' lan-
guage. In fact, the court saw the central issue somewhat differ-
ently. For the Second Circuit, "[t]he crux of the dispute is ... 
whether one or more of the pertinent electronic databases may 
be considered a 'revision' of the individual periodical issues 
from which the articles were taken.''64 Such a formulation ig-
nores "distribution" and places all its weight on the "reproduc-
tion" prong of the privilege.65 This is troublesome because the 
c:i Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 168 (emphasis added). 
64 Id. at 165. 
65 When a freelancer's writing is put into a CD-ROM or an online database of 
articles, the step that fixes the digital version in a physical medium is "reproduc-
tion." This point assumes that making the online website involves initially storing 
the material on one or more hard drives. Websites cannot be maintained solely in 
RAM form. It is far from clear that ephemeral RAM storage should be governed 
by the "reproduction right." Not only is there a separate display right available 
under the statute, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000), but the legislative history to the Copy-
right Act states that "the definition of 'fixation'. . . exclude[s) from the concept 
purely evanescent or transient reproductions such as those projected briefly on a 
screen, shown electronically or a television or other cathode ray tube, or captured 
momentarily in the 'memory' of a computer." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, available at 1976 WL 14045. It is difficult to 
see a difference between "reproduction" and "fixation" under the statute-and this 
Essay argues that neither should be satisfied by manifestation in RAM. The prac-
tical issues here are large. If appearance in RAM is merely a "display," then the 
applicable right only gives the copyright owner power when the display is made 
"publicly." 17 U.S.C. § 106(5). Since the copyright owner's display rights are limit-
ed to "public" displays, private users of the Internet get some shelter. On the 
contrary, if appearance in RAM form would be considered a "reproduction," even 
private actions by individual consumers at their home computers would trigger a 
copyright owner's prima facie right. To hold that every private person is "copying" 
when they receive something in RAM may extend the copyright owners' rights 
impermissibly, creating problems both for free speech and for privacy. See, e.g., 
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panel is not fully persuasive regarding the production of data-
bases that, unlike NEXIS, contain full-text and full-format 
imaging of the collective works. 
When analyzing a particular digital version that seems to 
have contained full-format exact copies, the Second Circuit 
ruled that such a version also infringed. The court reasoned, 
"Although this database contains scanned photo-images of edi-
tions of The New York Times Sunday book review and maga-
zine, it also contains articles from numerous other periodicals. 
In this respect, then, it is also substantially similar to NEXIS, 
and it, too, is at best a new anthology."66 If the book review 
and magazine sections of the New York Times are independent 
"collective works," it is hard to imagine that merely collecting 
several verbatim, full-format issues of each on a disk together 
with other fully-copied periodicals makes a new "version" that 
exceeds the privilege, 67 any more than a library infringes a 
copyright holder's rights when it binds journal issues together 
in a hard-cover volume. The court here seems to be falling into 
the same kind of error as exhibited in the much-criticized opin-
ion in Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.,68 
where the Ninth Circuit found it improper to mount a photo-
graph on a ceramic back without the permission of the copy-
right owner.69 One could well imagine that other circuit 
courts, or the Supreme Court, would disagree with the Second 
Circuit on this issue. Indeed, the availability of the § 201(c) 
privilege should not depend on whether several complete is-
sues of a given magazine or newspaper appear together on the 
Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 
40 (1994). Interestingly, Congress recently overturned the case most often relied on 
when arguing that reading material into RAM can constitute a violation of the re-
production right. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 
1993), overturned by Title III of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 
105-304 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (1998)). Congress did not alter the general 
definition of "reproduction" in this piecemeal correction. The § 117(c) exemption 
applies only if a "copy" has been made, without specifying whether RAM consti-
tutes something solid enough to be a "copy." Nevertheless, the sequence does indi-
cate that assimilating RAM into "reproduction" can have undesirable consequences. 
66 Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 170 (discussing "General Periodicals OnDisk"). 
61 This should be contrasted with the way a database, like NEXIS, dissolves 
one periodical into a sea of writings. 
68 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988). 
69 Id. For an astute opinion declining to follow Mirage, see Lee v. AR.T. Co., 
125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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same computer disks or are available on the same web site. 
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit may be correct in reject-
ing § 20l(c)'s applicability to exact and full-format digital re-
productions. For example, the legislative history of § 201(c) 
indicates that, in 1976, Congress believed that "[t]he basic pre-
sumption of § 201(c) is fully consistent with present law and 
practice, and represents a fair balancing of the equities. "70 
Therefore, in interpreting the undefined word, "revision," refer-
ence might be made both to 1976-era practice and general 
fairness. It is quite possible that, through these lenses, any-
thing intended to give profit through exploiting individual 
articles would not be seen as a "revision." This Essay takes no 
position on that question. Rather, this Essay emphasizes that 
regardless of whether reproducing a particular digital version 
constitutes a "revision," lawfully produced under§ 201(c), mak-
ing individual items available for download is a "distribution" 
that infringes a freelancer's copyright. 
This distinction can be important because the Supreme 
Court might conceivably hold that a publisher is privileged 
under § 201(c) if he reproduces the freelancers' articles as part 
of a full-format, full-text digital version of his periodical. If the 
Supreme Court took this step, an issue would arise over 
whether a publisher could also provide a download option for 
such a digital version. This Essay argues that the answer 
would be "no": before any online database can lawfully distrib-
ute individual downloads, and regardless of whether the data-
base itself was lawfully made, the database must have per-
mission from the freelancers who own the copyrights in the 
individual articles. 
B. Individual Downloads 
The § 201(c) presumptive privilege applies to two distinct 
rights of a copyright owner: the reproduction right and the 
distribution right.71 When a later edition or revision of a 
newspaper or encyclopedia is printed, § 201(c) allows the pub-
lisher to reproduce copies of freelance articles that were li-
70 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 123 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
available at 1976 WL 14045. 
71 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) ("privilege of reproducing and distributing"). 
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censed earlier; this is the "reproduction" aspect of § 201(c).72 
In addition, the publisher can sell that later edition or revi-
sion; this is the "distribution" aspect of§ 201(c).73 "Reproduc-
tion" and "distribution" are separate rights under federal copy-
right law.74 Section 201(c) provides that such reproduction 
and distribution can occur only "as part of' the later edition or 
revision.75 Thus, a publisher violates the law by either a re-
production or a distribution that takes place not "as part of' a 
"revision."76 It is fairly well established that sending an image 
or text out for download constitutes an act of distribution. 77 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
,. Id. § 106(1) (granting exclusive right of reproduction); id. § 106(3) (granting 
exclusive right of distribution). 
75 17 U.S.C. § 201(c). 
76 Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1149 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 
77 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 551 
(N.D. Tex. 1997) (concluding that ''Webbworld 'distributed' PEI's copyrighted works 
by allowing its users to download and print copies of electronic image files"); Play-
boy Enters. Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding the 
operator of a subscription online bulletin board service liable for infringing distri-
bution). In cases like Frena, the question usually concerns the relatively passive 
role of the electronic service provider, who may have no knowledge of what is 
posted or what is downloaded. By contrast, defendants in Tasini either provide 
content or maintain their own websites. Thus, no plausible issue of ignorance can 
be raised. 
It may not matter whether plaintiffs can specifically prove that their individu-
al articles were downloaded. See Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1997). In Hotaling, the defendant argued that 
"holding a work in a library collection that is open to the public constitutes, at 
most, an offer to distribute the work. In order to establish distribution, the [defen-
dant) argue[d), the evidence would need to show that a member of the public ac-
cepted such an offer." Id. A similar issue may arise in Tasini. The defendants may 
argue that holding a work on a database open to individual downloads does not 
amount to distribution without proof that the database actually sent out an article 
in response to a download request. The Hotaling court rejected such a view and 
held the defendant liable: 
When a public library adds a work to its collection, lists the work in its 
index or catalog system, and makes the work available to the borrowing 
or browsing public, it has completed all the steps necessary for distri-
bution to the public. At that point, members of the public can visit the 
library and use the work. Were this not to be considered distribution 
within the meaning of § 106(3), a copyright holder would be prejudiced 
by a library that does not keep records of public use, and the library 
would unjustly profit by its own omission. 
Id. Similarly, making the individual works available for download, in circumstanc-
es where it is virtually certain that some such individual downloads occurred, may 
be sufficient. 
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A focus on the freelancers' exclusive right of distribution78 
also disposes of a red herring introduced by the defendants, 
namely, contributory infringement based on the acts of end 
users. 79 Whether end users are sheltered by the fair use doc-
trine when downloading from the defendants' web sites is irrel-
evant because at the same time as a consumer is reproducing 
the article in question, the database proprietor is distributing 
the article-an act of direct, not contributory, infringement. 
Each act-the consumer's reproduction, the service's dis-
tribution, and the print publisher's assistance in the distribu-
tion and making of the database-is a separate candidate for 
copyright infringement.80 Was a database distributing indi-
vidual articles? Did a publisher act to further that end? If so, 
both the database proprietor (as a direct infringer) and the 
print publisher (as an entity that contributed to and induced 
the database proprietor's infringing distribution81) are liable 
for distributing a copyrighted item in a way that is not "part 
of' a collective work. The end users have nothing to do with it. 
Furthermore, a large commercial database service like 
NEXIS can be infringing even if many of its customers are 
engaged in fair use.82 Economic analysis suggests that when 
78 Admittedly, the plaintiffs do not seem to have explicitly focused on the 
defendants' active role in distributing downloads. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint contains several allegations that downloading occurred and 
that the distribution right was violated both directly and contributorily. See 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 'll'll 40, 48, 49, 350, 358 and 359, Tasini v. New 
York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (No. 93 Civ. 8678), available at 
http://www.nwu.org/tvt/tvtcompl.htm (visited Feb. 16, 2001). 
79 For the defendants' arguments regarding contributory infringement and fair 
use, see Defendants' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 22-26, Tasini v. New York 
Times Co., 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3316 (U.S. Nov. 
6, 2000) (No. 00-201). 
80 See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
81 
"One who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or 
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 
'contributory' infringer." Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 1485 (citing Gershwin Publish-
ing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
82 Cf. Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1558 ("One who distributes copyrighted material 
for profit is engaged in a commercial use even if the customers supplied with such 
material themselves use it for personal use."). Admittedly, if all individual consum-
er uses are fair, that tends to suggest that whatever enables the fair uses to 
occur should also be noninfringing. Thus, if a commercial service has enabled 
another person's fair use, that should be relevant to the treatment given the com-
mercial entity. But nothing mandates that the individual and the distributional 
entity must be treated exactly the same. To the contrary, it is well established 
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transaction cost difficulties provide the reason for fair use 
treatment, the fair use doctrine might legitimately give less 
generous treatment to centralized commercial entities than to 
the individual consumers whom the entities serve. 83 
Perhaps as a way of escaping the "as part of' limitation, 
the publishers apparently argued that "whether an electronic 
database infringes upon an individual author's article would 
essentially turn upon whether the rest of the articles from the 
particular edition in which the individual article was published 
could also be retrieved individually."84 Such an argument 
seems to imagine that an article can be considered distributed 
"as part of' a collective work whenever a consumer could, by a 
properly worded search, call up the remainder of the periodical 
in which the article appeared. However, it does not much mat-
ter whether the other articles could be retrieved with others. 
What is crucial is that the electronic distribution did not re-
quire that the individual articles be retrieved only in the con-
text of the entire edition.85 By providing individual down-
loads, the distribution exceeds the presumptive privilege-even 
if such privilege is available for the act of making the electron-
ic version. To repeat: The Copyright Act explicitly allows redis-
tribution of the individually-owned articles only "as part of' a 
collective work, a revision, or a later edition, and not individu-
ally.8s 
under the fair use doctrine that the commercial character of a use can make a 
significant difference. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
83 See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural 
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1600 (1982). 
8
' Tasini II, 206 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 1999). 
85 Thus, the Second Circuit wrote: 
[l)t is significant that neither the publishers nor NEXIS evince any in-
tent to compel, or even to permit, an end user to retrieve an individual 
wor~ only in connection with other works from the edition in which it 
ran. Quite the contrary, the New York Times actually forbids NEXIS 
from producing "facsimile reproductions" of particular editions. 
Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 169 (citing Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. 804, 826 n.17 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)). 
86 17 U.S.C. § 201(c). 
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III. TRANSFERABILITY 
The court declined to reach the question of assignability of 
the privilege.87 Nevertheless, several sections of the opinion 
intimated that the court thought that the privilege could not 
be transferred. 88 Therefore, since a significant scope for a 
privilege under§ 20l(c) remains after Tasini, it is important to 
clarify whether the privilege can be assigned and (a separate 
and interesting question) whether it can be shared. If both are 
prohibited, then the privilege attaches inalienably to the initial 
publisher who purchases a license to publish the freelancer's 
work. 
To hold the privilege inalienable would be overbroad. In-
alienability would mean that any time a publishing company is 
sold, no § 201(c) privilege adheres to the collective works that 
are sold with it. Similarly, publishers often buy and sell entire 
collective-work copyrights. Indeed, it is hardly remarkable for 
one publisher to sell all her rights in a particular encyclopedia 
to another publisher. When that occurs, the privilege to reprint 
the entire set is expected to accompany the sale. However, if 
87 Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 165 & n.2. Footnote 2 was added in the final version 
of the opinion, but it was not present in the withdrawn version. It is unclear 
what the note adds because the opinion already stated, "We need not, and do not, 
reach the question whether this privilege is transferable under Section 201(d)." Id. 
at 165. By comparison, footnote 2 states, "We also do not consider the issue of 
assignability. Rather, we assume for purposes of this decision only, that the Pub-
lishers had the right to assign the articles in question to Mead and UMI." Id. at 
165 n.2. Perhaps the footnote was intended to explain away all mentions of trans-
ferability in the opinion as arguendo assumptions. 
88 Thus, in summarizing the statute, the court writes, "Section 201(c) creates a 
presumption that when the author of an article gives the publisher the author's 
permission to include the article in a collective work, as here, the author also 
gives a non-assignable, non-exclusive privilege to use the article as identified in 
the statute." Id. at 166 (emphasis added). Conceivably the court's comments here 
arose merely out of indulging arguendo the publishers' arguments that the privi-
lege could be transferred. See id. at 165 n.2. But the language about assignability 
seems to go further. Incidentally, even where entitlements cannot be assigned, 
privileges can sometimes be shared and rights can sometimes be waived. However, 
the court does not address the distinction between assignment and other powers. 
For another hint that the court thinks the presumptive privilege is non-transfer-
able, the fmal opinion added quotation marks around the word "privilege," as if to 
distinguish it from transferable "right" in a context where rights are statutorily 
transferable and privileges have no such express transferability. Tasini II, 206 
F.3d at 168 n.3. The addition of these quotation marks is one of the few changes 
that the final opinion made to the material appearing in the withdrawn opinion. 
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the § 201(c) privilege were not transferable, the buyer of an 
encyclopedia title could not do new press runs of the encyclope-
dia because it would be an infringing reproduction.89 Such a 
result would be absurd. 
This Essay suggests that the Copyright Act itself offers a 
compromise position between the inalienability apparently 
proposed by the plaintiffs and the full transferability apparent-
ly proposed by the defendants. According to the statute, the 
privilege inheres in "the owner of copyright in the collective 
work. "90 This phrase can be interpreted as referencing a sta-
tus rather than an individual. If so, when there is a change in 
the identity of the owner of the collective-work copyright, the 
holder of the privilege would change as well. The privilege 
could and would attach to the new owner, appurtenant to the 
ownership of copyright in the entire collective work. 
Of course, this does not end all issues of transfer. In 
Tasini, the publishers may have tried to license a use of their 
purported privilege to the database proprietors as a bare li-
cense-that is, without selling the overall copyright.91 Howev-
er, such a bare license might not suffice to carry the privilege 
with it, and this raises different and complex issues. Some 
bare licenses are fully alienable (e.g., a typical movie ticket), 
but some are inalienable (e.g., the invitation from one friend to 
another to "drop in Tuesday night"). One of the plaintiffs' at-
torneys in Tasini persuasively argued that non-exclusive li-
censes in the patent area are not transferable. 92 In my view, 
neither the argument by analogy from patent law nor the 
Copyright Act93 fully resolves the issue of the privilege's puta-
89 17 u.s.c. § 106(1). 
90 17 U.S.C. § 201(c). 
91 The fact that the collective-work copyright can be subdivided generates fur-
ther complications: Can the privilege accompany each assignment? Can it also 
remain with the seller so long as he retains any exclusive rights? I would suggest 
the answer to both questions is "yes." If Publishing Company A receives an exclu-
sive right to publish a collective work on the West Coast, but Publishing Company 
B retains all other rights, both have "a copyright." Giv'en the divisibility of copy-
right endorsed by the 1976 Act, it is probable that the privilege could inhere in 
both. Although § 201(d)(2) does not mention "privileges" when it approves divisibil-
ity, it seems to contemplate that all copyright holders will be treated equally. 
92 See Alice Haemmerli, Commentary: Tasini v New York Times Co., 22 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 133-40 (1998). 
93 The Copyright Act provides that "[a)ny of the exclusive rights comprised in a 
copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, 
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tive inalienability. However, that issue need not be reached if 
there is no applicable privilege to transfer. 
N. ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 
The Tasini decisio~ not only operates prospectively, it also 
imposes liability on publishers and database proprietors for 
already-extant electronic versions. The publishers and data-
base proprietors have been proceeding without appropriate 
consent from the freelance copyright holders for some time. 
Thus, the Tasini decision could cause some writings to disap-
pear from the electronic record, either because an author is 
reluctant to license them or because a publisher prefers purg-
may be transferred." 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2). The Second Circuit hints that it be-
lieves that under the Copyright Act, only "rights," and not "privileges," can be 
transferred. However, this cannot be correct because unless privileges constitute a 
transferable component of copyright assignments, a buyer cannot use what he has 
purchased. Section 106-the central grant of rights in the Copyright Act-is proba-
bly the source of the confusion because it mixes rights, privileges, and powers. 
Section 106 provides that copyright owners have "the exclusive rights to do and to 
authorize" certain acts in regard to their works. This phrasing does not distinguish 
between rights and privileges: 
Although section 106 employs only the word "rights," it uses that word 
loosely, as synonymous with "entitlements." In fact, section 106 consti-
tutes a simultaneous award of Hohfeldian rights, privileges, and powers 
over the enumerated uses. Because the section 106 grants are "exclusive," 
the owner has the [Hohfeldian] right to exclude others from the physical 
acts described. Because the section 106 grant includes an entitlement "to 
do" the enumerated physical acts, creators have a [Hohfeldian] privilege 
to use their creations in the manners specified. Because the grant awards 
an entitlement "to authorize" the various physical acts, creators have a 
[Hohfeldian] power to transfer their entitlements. Because creators hold 
that power "exclusive[ly]," they also have an immunity from other 
persons' efforts to affect the legal status of the copyright. Thus, the intel-
lectual property entitlements include, for example, the privilege to make 
reproductions, the right to forbid strangers to make reproductions, and 
the power to sell others a privilege to make reproductions. 
Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into The Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of 
Consistency, Consent and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1366 
(1989). 
Admittedly, as the Second Circuit notes, a "right" in technical lawyers' lan-
guage is not a "privilege," and Congress used both "right" and "privilege" with 
distinct meanings in 201(c). Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 168 n.3. Moreover, also admit-
tedly, the Act says nothing explicit about the transferability of "privileges." Id. at 
168. But in everyday parlance, many of the Hohfeldian terms-"rights," "privileg-
es," and "powers"-are collapsed into the catchall term "right." Sometimes the 
same people who use Hohfeldian precision at one moment may use everyday lan-
guage the next. 
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ing to paying.94 It is sometimes argued, therefore, that Tasini 
will cause unacceptable disruption of libraries and archives. 
Although some excision from the electronic record is possi-
ble, the extent of such losses is easily exaggerated. It is doubt-
ful that libraries have already come so unmoored from their 
paper origins that the public record will be seriously impaired 
by temporary gaps in the electronic record. Further, the Na-
tional Writers Union offers a clearinghouse solution to provide 
publishers and databases the licenses they need to keep most 
of the record intact.95 Additionally, if the Supreme Court 
cures the Second Circuit's arguable over-generosity, some of 
the records could be retained as-is.96 
Moreover, and most importantly, it may be unwise to 
adopt a principle that counsels surrender whenever powerful 
entities, like major publishers, have induced the public to rely 
on a continuance of the entities' unlawful behavior. As cases 
like Tasini and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 91 illus-
trate, computer technology and the Internet community evolve 
so quickly that behaviors of fairly clear illegality can spawn 
institutions and customs before the courts can respond. Some-
times those new institutions and customs are desirable; some-
times they are not. However, regardless of their merit, the 
speed of technological development may result in institutions 
and customs that are costly to unravel. This, in effect, can em-
power one party to hold the public hostage. 98 
94 Withdrawing infringing material does not eliminate the obligation to pay for 
past infringements, of course, but it does avoid liability for continuing infringe-
ments. 
95 See Publication Rights Clearinghouse, at http://www.nwu.org (last modified 
Jan. 20, 2000). 
98 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (suggesting that reproduction 
of magazines and newspapers in complete and exact form on computer has some 
arguable claim to be privileged). 
97 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
98 For example, when one party unilaterally engages in unlawful behavior with 
effects that are costly to unravel, society's interests are affected whatever course a 
court chooses. Approving the behavior would be unjust, but undoing its effects may 
impose costs on innocent third parties. Thus, in Tasini, it would be contrary to 
law to approve everything that the publishers have done, but declaring their be-
havior infringing may result in libraries, researchers, and other innocent third 
parties having to bear transaction costs and other burdens. Thus, a court might 
understandably desire to avoid the social costs that would be entailed in undoing 
the unlawful institution. However, yielding to this desire is like yielding to a hos-
tage-taker: yielding to strength rather than to a claim of right. 
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It is easy to be blinded by the interests of the affected 
hostages, here the archivists and researchers. Nevertheless, 
the long-term desirability of customs or institutions should be 
assessed separately from the short-term costs that unraveling 
them may impose.99 For example, it is possible that enforcing 
the freelancers' rights will have permanent and positive incen-
tive effects, increasing the quantity and quality of work pro-
duced. Consequently, researchers may receive far more in the 
long run than they will lose during the transition period. Fur-
thermore, of course, not all morality is subsumed in an eco-
nomic calculus. 
Nevertheless, custom is often legitimately r.elevant to legal 
decision-making.100 Does this suggest that deference should 
be given to the publishers' custom of engaging in electronic 
distribution without consulting or paying the freelancers? The 
response is negative, and threefold. First, the so-called custom 
is unilateral. Second, the relevant statute attempts to limit the 
relevance of changes in custom.101 Third, the primary reason 
that customs are often helpful to decision-makers-because 
they provide useful information about efficiency-does not 
apply to the publishers' practice of proceeding without obtain-
ing specific consent from the copyright holders. 
Regarding efficiency, the Coase Theorem suggests that 
efficient patterns are likely to emerge when parties deal with 
each other over a period of time, with good information and 
low transaction costs among them.102 When these conditions 
are present, a custom is likely to be a useful guide for how 
resources should be used. 103 The freelancers would argue that 
99 See supra note 98. Also note that this Essay touches on only one aspect of 
the many relevant normative debates. 
100 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: 
Custom And Law As Sources Of Property Rights In News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85,.85-
89 (1992). 
101 Section 201(c) attempted to capture a set of practices and customs that 
seemed fair to Congress at a particular time. As the 1976 House Report stated, 
"The basic presumption of section 201(c) is fully consistent with present law and 
practice, and represents a fair balancing of the equities." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 
at 123 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, auailable at 1976 WL 14045. 
Further, the statute explicitly states that the publisher "is presumed to have ac-
quired only" the set of listed privileges. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000) (emphasis add-
ed). 
1~2 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 
293 (1960). 
103 By "resource use" or "resource allocation," I am referring to how physical or 
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these Coasean conditions are not applicable because the 
publishers' electronic practices occurred after the freelancers 
sold the initial story rights; thus, the freelancers would face 
prohibitive transaction costs in trying to affect the behavior. 
The publishers would probably reply that because most of the 
freelancers are repeat players, the condition of frequent inter-
action in a low transaction-cost setting was indeed satisfied. 
However, both arguments would miss a deeper point. Interac-
tion among parties can tell us something about desirable re-
source use, but it tells us nothing about what might be the 
desirable distribution of the resulting gains.104 Thus, al-
though the custom of electronic publishing may be desirable, 
the custom of not paying for the privilege can easily change 
without impeding the publishing itself. That is, no one denies 
that electronic publication and distribution is a good thing-an 
efficient use of resources. But, also, no one doubts that this 
good thing will continue to occur after the freelancers' rights 
are honored. The publishers may be more adept than individu-
al authors at arranging for dissemination, but nothing sug-
gests that the authors will have trouble identifying and locat-
ing the publishers as potential licensees.105 
human capacities are deployed, for example, whether a given field should be 
planted in wheat or grazed by cattle or whether a given writer should spend her 
days writing freelance newspaper articles or working for a public-relations firm. 
'°' If a field's most efficient use is as a wheat field, and a person's most effi-
cient use of her skills is as a farmer, then resource allocation is satisfied if she 
plants wheat in that particular field. But whether she owns the field and its pro-
duce, or is merely an employee or tenant farmer, is primarily a "distributional" 
issue. 
105 It is sometimes argued that centralizing the control of intellectual properties 
will increase efficiency. See generally Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of 
the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). Kitch argued that even aside from 
incentives to invent, patent law provided desirable mechanisms for coordinating 
follow-on research and other exploitation of inventions. At least one author has 
tried to extend a related thesis into copyright, arguing that large corporations are 
the best copyright owners because the biggest entities have the best distributional 
and exploitation networks. See generally Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, Don't 
Put My Article Online!: Extending Copyright's New-Use Doctrine To The Electronic 
Publishing Media And Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1995). Rosenzweig sug-
gests that in cases where contracts are ambiguous, it is best to construe new use 
rights as going to publishers rather than to individual authors and artists, because 
the corporations have better capacities for distribution and exploitation than do 
the individuals, and because the individual creators have formed no expectations of 
reward. Although Rosenzweig stops short of recommending that rights to CD-
ROMS and online databases be resolved in this manner, Rosenzweig, supra, at 
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Also, to the extent that a publisher has superior knowl-
edge about the value or imminence of a new technological use, 
there will be asymmetric information when that publisher 
meets a freelancer over the bargaining table. The § 201(c) 
privilege is a default term; it is intended to fill gaps where ex-
930, the pro-centralization thesis warrants some attention. 
Whatever the merits of the Kitch thesis in regard to organizing research and 
development in the physical sciences, where simultaneous invention is common and 
many of the investigative processes are likely to be chosen identically by similarly-
situated researchers, the Kitch thesis has much less applicability in the cultural 
realm. Each cultural product is likely to be unique and many are personal to their 
authors. Moreover, it is uniformity rather than diversity that we have most to fear 
in the cultural sphere. Finally, opting to favor the "best disseminator" can retard 
initial creativity. 
For example, consider the dispute between Warner Brothers and author 
Dashiel Hammett over Hammett's desire to continue writing and selling stories 
featuring the character he created, Sam Spade. In an ambiguous contract, 
Hammett sold Warner Brothers certain rights in THE MALTESE FALCON, a success-
ful novel featuring Sam Spade. Warner Brothers contended that the contract gave 
it all rights to the character, and it sued when Hammett sold new stories and 
conveyed some rights relating to Sam Spade to others. In a well-known decision, 
the Ninth Circuit found that Hammett had retained rights over his character. See 
Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954.). It 
hardly seems plausible to argue, as a pro-centralization thesis would seem to sug-
gest, that the public would have benefitted more if the corporation had won. 
In some abstract world, perhaps, Warner Brothers could have hired Hammett 
to write the story, and in that abstract world, perhaps, Warner Brothers could 
have obtained as good and diverse results from Hammett-the-employee as 
Hammett-the-independent-writer could produce on his own. In the real world, how-
ever, it if? likely that Hammett produced better as an independent writer and that 
depriving him of ownership would have decreased his creativity. That is, giving 
the corporation the rights would have had a negative effect on how resources are 
used. This can be usefully compared with the Tasini outcome, where affirming the 
authors' electronic rights is likely to have no negative resource-allocative effects in 
the long term. 
But again, the central point to note is that the patterns of distribution will 
not change much, if at all, if Tasini is affirmed. Indeed, freelancers will continue 
to sell newspapers and magazines, and publishers, in tum, will utilize their distri-
bution skills. The difference is that, after Tasini, the freelancers can demand pay-
ment for the extra value that electronic publishing gives their work. Whether the 
demand would yield any extra money is a question of bargaining power. 
These differences in income might have some incentive effect, but the question 
is quite speculative. For example, there might be a small shift of income from 
publishers as a group to authors as a group or there might be a small shift of 
income from freelancers in general to the individual freelancers whose articles are 
most often downloaded. Either side could speculate further about the incentive 
effects of any income differences that did result. Would publishers be less likely to 
experiment with new technology? Would skilled freelancers strongly increase their 
output? Given the clear language of the statute, and the absence of any imminent 
emergency, it seems unnecessary for a court to resolve these questions. 
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plicit contractual specification is absent. One influential theory 
of such terms suggests that defaults can usefully function to 
push a party with better knowledge to be explicit.106 Thus, 
one viewing§ 201(c) from the perspective of the penalty theory 
of defaults would argue in favor of excluding electronic rights 
as a new and valuable use from the scope of the default privi-
lege. If that were the rule, the publisher would have to raise 
the issue during negotiations to contract for a right to use the 
new technology. Such an approach-consistent with the Second 
Circuit's holding in Tasini-would provide a mechanism for 
alerting the less informed freelancer that there is something to 
contract about, thereby mitigating the informational asymme-
try.101 
Moreover, there is no prima facie moral reason to favor the 
publisher over the author. To the contrary, the author has a 
stronger claim of right on her side.108 To the extent that the 
court is concerned with gaps during the transition period, or 
with the desirability of encouraging fast actors like the pub-
lishers to take advantage of new technology, alternatives are 
available. For example, any injunctive relief could be limited so 
that it functions prospectively only. Thus, a court-administered 
scheme of monetary recovery for existing infringements-a 
kind of retrospective compulsory license-could be a useful 
result.109 The worst result would be to pretend that no in-
fringement has occurred. 
106 
"Penalty defaults, by definition, give at least one party to the contract an 
incentive to contract around the default. From an efficiency perspective, penalty 
default rules can be justified as a way to encourage the production of information." 
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97 (1989). 
107 I am indebted to Bob Bone for this formulation. 
108 A full exploration of this issue is outside the scope of this Essay. For a 
detailed discussion, see generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Ex-
pression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 
102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) (arguing that creators have a moral claim, albeit limit-
ed, to ownership of their works). 
109 The Court has hinted that it may be appropriate to deny injunctive relief 
when public discourse is affected by copyright enforcement. See Campbell v Acuff. 
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994). 
2000) TASINI AND A PUBLISHERS' PRESUMPTIVE PRIVILEGE 499 
CONCLUSION 
In Tasini, neither the district court nor the Second Circuit 
focused sufficiently on the express limitation in§ 201(c), which 
states that its distribution privilege applies only to distribu-
tions of individual works done "as part of' a collective 
work.110 Even if a privilege were available to allow a new col-
lective work to be made, § 201 would not cover distribution of 
the individually-owned articles, except in connection with the 
whole collective work. Distribution out of context, as enabled 
by the typical electronic service, is clearly not permissible 
under § 201(c). 
In Tasini, the Second Circuit held that the defendants' 
infringed the freelancers' right of reproduction by making digi-
tal versions. Nevertheless, after Tasini, many actions remain 
that are covered by the presumptive privilege. For example, 
where not negated by the parties, the privilege under§ 201(c) 
allows the publisher of an encyclopedia to print and distribute 
later editions, notwithstanding the copyright interests of indi-
vidual contributors. Therefore, the question of the privilege's 
alienability remains important. 
For example, imagine that a print publisher is sold to a 
larger company, or that two publishing companies merge and 
transfer their assets to the new entity, or that the publisher of 
many collective works decides to sell one of them (say, a maga-
zine) to a new publisher. Congress would probably be shocked 
to find out that the new owner of the collective work copyrights 
would be forbidden from re-issuing them. Indeed, ENCYCLOPE-
DIA BRITANNICA or WORLD BOOK should not be required to 
repurchase every freelance article in its volumes whenever 
corporate ownership changes. This Essay does not address the 
question of whether the privilege should be transferable "in 
gross." This Essay does, however, argue that the§ 201(c) privi-
lege should be capable of accompanying any sale of copyright 
in the full collective work. Indeed, the statutory language per-
mits, and may even encourage, such a reading. 
As for the gaps in the electronic record that the Tasini 
decision may cause during a transition period, the affected 
researchers can be analogized to innocent hostages. While 
110 See supra text accompanying note 64. 
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sometimes it may be necessary to pay ransom to safeguard 
hostages, there are both ethical and incentive problems in sur-
rendering to one party to protect another party whom the first 
party's behavior has imperiled. The rule of law has some flex-
ibility in it, but nothing about the facts in Tasini appears so 
urgent that the Court should avert its attention from the 
defendants' clearly infringing conduct. If the freelancers' copy-
rights are given their due, electronic publishing will still go 
forward, and there might be an ethically and economically 
desirable shift in incentive patterns as a result. 
